Suchergebnisse

James M. Buchanan's latest contribution to the post-crisis debate in political economy underpins the necessity to reexamine the legacy of the "Old Chicago" School of thought, being urged by Buchanan's recently stressed plea at the 2009 Regional Meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society and at the Summer Institute for the Preservation of the History of Economic Thought in 2010. The focus of the current paper is to follow his plea by exploring the central topoi of the 1930's debate of the Chicago School as seen from the work of Henry Simons and discuss its impact on the academic arena on both sides of the Atlantic thereafter. With respect to this impact, we highlight Friedrich A. von Hayek as the focal scholar who possibly transmits these topoi that later influenced the rise of Freiburgean ordoliberalism in Germany from the mid-1930's onwards as youngest archival findings suggest. By revisiting the MPS 1947 first meeting's minutes and papers, we stress the proximity in mind of "Old Chicago", Hayek and the Freiburg School ordo-liberals by contributing an explanation for the surprisingly homogenous direction of these yet unconnected schools of thought. n a next, enhanced version of this project, we will subsequently re-discuss the intellectual origins of Constitutional Political Economy's research program. Following Viktor Vanberg, we argue that CPE can be interpreted as a modernized perspective on economics that carries forward three strands of transatlantic liberal programs, being precisely "Old Chicago", Freiburg and Hayek.

ZusammenfassungWas ist das geld(-ordnungs)theoretische Anliegen der Freiburger Schule? Wie entstand es und worauf zielt die hier vorgestellte Geldordnungstheorie ab? Diese Fragen werden in dem vorliegenden Beitrag dogmenhistorisch untersucht und ordnungsökonomisch eingeordnet. Es wird gezeigt, dass die Gründungsgeneration der Freiburger Schule um Walter Eucken unterschiedliche Geldordnungsvorschläge vorlegte, um eine Geldverfassung institutionell so auszugestalten, dass sie das Leistungskriterium der Geldwertstabilität langfristig erfüllen kann. Die Geldsystemtheorie Euckens und ihre Rückbindung an die Kapitaltheorie liefern den theoretischen Ausgangspunkt der Geldordnungstheorie. Die Zeitgebundenheit dieser Theorie und der konkreten Vorschläge widersprechen ihrer Rekonstruktion, um sie für die aktuelle Debatte um die Reform der EWU wieder einzuführen. Wer an dieser Frage interessiert ist, wird in diesem Beitrag keine Antworten finden.

AbstractThis article depicts the parallel evolution of the political economies of the "Old Chicago" and Freiburg schools. Both communities within the "laissez-faire within rules" research program and the long-standing "thinking in orders" tradition emerged during the 1930s and culminated in the 1940s, crystallizing around the personalities of Henry C. Simons and Walter Eucken. We show how, in an age of disintegration of national and international orders of economy and society, the political economists at Chicago and Freiburg underwent a double transition: from students of equilibrium to students of order, and from students of various positive orders to defenders of a specific normative order. The vision of the normative order on both sides of the Atlantic was the competitive order and its rules-based framework. Along with shared angst amid disintegrating orders, personal transatlantic connections between the two communities are identified, starting in Berlin during the 1920s. This article highlights the role of Friedrich A. Lutz, who, from the mid-1930s to Eucken's death and beyond, served as a lifeline between the isolated Freiburg school and Anglo-Saxon economists. Lutz's activities are embedded in a narrative of transatlantic conversations around Friedrich A. Hayek and the early meetings of the Mont Pèlerin Society.

James M. Buchanan's latest contribution to the post-crisis debate in political economy underpins the necessity to reexamine the legacy of the Old Chicago School of thought, being urged by Buchanan's recently stressed plea at the 2009 Regional Meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society and at the Summer Institute for the Preservation of the History of Economic Thought in 2010. The focus of the current paper is to follow his plea by exploring the central topoi of the 1930's debate of the Chicago School as seen from the work of Henry Simons and discuss its impact on the academic arena on both sides of the Atlantic thereafter. With respect to this impact, we highlight Friedrich A. von Hayek as the focal scholar who possibly transmits these topoi that later influenced the rise of Freiburgean ordoliberalism in Germany from the mid-1930's onwards as youngest archival findings suggest. By revisiting the MPS 1947 first meeting's minutes and papers, we stress the proximity in mind of Old Chicago, Hayek and the Freiburg School ordo-liberals by contributing an explanation for the surprisingly homogenous direction of these yet unconnected schools of thought. n a next, enhanced version of this project, we will subsequently re-discuss the intellectual origins of Constitutional Political Economy's research program. Following Viktor Vanberg, we argue that CPE can be interpreted as a modernized perspective on economics that carries forward three strands of transatlantic liberal programs, being precisely Old Chicago, Freiburg and Hayek.

AbstractJames Buchanan would have celebrated his 100th birthday in 2019. This serves as an inspiration to look at the future of public choice and the question of how much normativity public choice can bear. In our analysis we draw parallels between public choice and German ordoliberalism (and its source in the Freiburg School of Economics). We argue that the reception of ordoliberalism exemplifies easy-to-grasp pitfalls that should be taken seriously. We anchor the future agenda of public choice in a solid individualist perspective. Similar to ordoliberalism, public choice will have to clarify its relation to normative economics. The effects of rules and institutions and their working properties should be thoroughly analyzed empirically. The role of ideas is important for the normative foundation of both public choice/ constitutional economics and ordoliberalism, and is rooted in normative individualism. It provides a benchmark by which rules and institutions can be judged as favorable.